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We formulate a general class of allocation problems called categorized domain allocation problems (CDAPs),
where indivisible items from multiple categories are allocated to agents without monetary transfer and each
agent gets at least one item per category.
We focus on basic CDAPs, where the number of items in each category is equal to the number of
agents. We characterize serial dictatorships for basic CDAPs by a minimal set of three axiomatic properties:
strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and category-wise neutrality. Then, we propose a natural extension of
serial dictatorships called categorial sequential allocation mechanisms (CSAMs), which allocate the items
in multiple rounds: in each round, the active agent chooses an item from a designated category. We fully
characterize the worst-case rank efficiency of CSAMs for optimistic and pessimistic agents, and provide a
bound for strategic agents. We also conduct experiments to compare expected rank efficiency of various
CSAMs w.r.t. random generated data.
1. INTRODUCTION
Suppose we are organizing a seminar and must allocate 10 discussion topics and 10 dates to
10 students. Students have heterogeneous and combinatorial preferences over (topic, date)
bundles: a student’s preferences over the topics may depend on the date and vice versa,
because she may prefer an early date if she gets an easy topic and may prefer a late date if
she gets a hard topic.
This example illustrates a common setting for allocating multiple indivisible items, which
we formulate as a categorized domain. A categorized domain contains multiple indivisible
items, each of which belongs to one of the p ≥ 1 categories. In categorized domain allocation
problems (CDAPs), we want to design a mechanism to allocate the items to agents without
monetary transfer, such that each agent gets at least one item per category. In the above
example, there are two categories: topics and dates, and each agent (student) must get a
topic and a date.
Many other allocation problems are CDAPs. For example, in cloud computing, agents
have heterogeneous preferences over multiple types of items including CPU, memory, and
storage1 [Ghodsi et al. 2011, 2012; Bhattacharya et al. 2013]; patients must be allocated mul-
tiple types of resources including surgeons, nurses, rooms, and equipment [Huh et al. 2013];
college students need to choose courses from multiple categories per semester, e.g. computer
science courses, math courses, social science courses, etc.
The design and analysis of allocation mechanisms for non-categorized domains have been
an active research area at the interface of computer science and economics. In computer
science, allocation problems have been studied as multi-agent resource allocation [Chevaleyre
et al. 2006]. In economics, allocation problems have been studied as one-sided matching,
also known as assignment problems [So¨nmez and U¨nver 2011]. Previous research faces three
main barriers.
• Preference bottleneck: When the number of items is not too small, it is impractical for
the agents to express their preferences over all (exponential) bundles of items.
• Computational bottleneck: Even if the agents can express their preferences compactly
using some preference language, computing an “optimal” allocation is often a hard combi-
natorial optimization problem.
1Suppose each type contains discrete units of resources that are essentially indivisible for operational con-
venience.
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• Threats of agents’ strategic behavior: An agent may have incentive to report untruthfully
to obtain a more preferred bundle. This may lead to a socially inefficient allocation.
Our Contributions. We initiate the study of mechanism design under the novel framework
of CDAPs towards breaking the three aforementioned barriers. CDAPs naturally generalize
classical non-categorized allocation problems, which are CDAPs with one category. CDAPs
are our main conceptual contribution.
As a first step, we focus on basic categorized domain allocation problems (basic CDAPs),
where the number of items in each category is exactly the same as the number of agents, so
that each agent gets exactly one item from each category. See e.g. the seminar-organization
example.
Our technical contributions are two-fold. First, we characterize serial dictatorships for any
basic CDAPs with at least two categories by a minimal set of three axiomatic properties:
strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and category-wise neutrality. This helps us understand the
possibility of designing strategy-proof mechanisms to overcome the third barrier, i.e. threats
of agents’ strategic behavior.
Second, to overcome the preference bottleneck and the computational bottleneck, and
to go beyond serial dictatorships, we propose categorial sequential allocation mechanisms
(CSAMs), which are a large class of indirect mechanisms that naturally extend serial dic-
tatorships [Svensson 1999], sequential allocation protocols [Bouveret and Lang 2011], and
the draft mechanism [Budish and Cantillon 2012]. For n agents and p categories, a CSAM
is defined by an ordering over all (agent, category) pairs: in each round, the active agent
picks an item that has not been chosen yet from the designated category. CSAMs have low
communication complexity and low computational complexity.
We completely characterize the worst-case rank efficiency of CSAMs, measured by agents’
ranks of the bundles they receive, for any combination of two types of myopic agents: opti-
mistic agents, who always choose the item in their top-ranked bundle that is still available,
and pessimistic agents, who always choose the item that gives them best worst-case guar-
antee. This characterization naturally leads to useful corollaries on worst-case efficiency of
various CSAMs. For example, we show that while serial dictatorships with all-optimistic
agents have the best worst-case utilitarian rank, they have the worst worst-case egalitarian
rank (Proposition 2). On the other hand, balanced CSAMs with all-pessimistic agents have
good worst-case egalitarian rank (Proposition 4). For strategic agents, we prove an upper
bound on the worst-case rank efficiency for all CSAMs, and a matching lower bound for
two agents.
We also use computer simulation to further compare expected utilitarian rank and ex-
pected egalitarian rank of some natural CSAMs where agents’ preferences are generated
from the Mallows model [Mallows 1957]. We observe that serial dictatorships with all-
optimistic agents have good expected utilitarian rank and bad expected egalitarian rank.
On the other hand, the balanced CSAMs with all-pessimistic agents have good expected
egalitarian rank.
Related Work and Discussions. We are not aware of previous work that explicitly formu-
lates the CDAP framework. Previous work on multi-type resource allocation assumes that
items of the same type are interchangeable, and agents have specific preferences, e.g. Leon-
tief preferences [Ghodsi et al. 2011] and threshold preferences [Huh et al. 2013]. CDAPs
are more general as agents’ preferences are only required to be rankings but not otherwise
restricted.
From the modeling perspective, ignoring the categorial information, CDAPs become stan-
dard centralized multi-agent resource allocation problems. However, the categorial informa-
tion opens more possibilities for designing natural allocation mechanisms such as CSAMs.
More importantly, we believe that CDAPs provide a natural framework for cross-fertilization
of ideas and techniques from other fields of preference representation and aggregation. For
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example, the combinatorial structure of categorized domains naturally allows agents to use
graphical languages (e.g. CP-nets [Boutilier et al. 2004]) to represent their preferences,
which is otherwise hard [Bouveret et al. 2009]. Approaches in combinatorial voting [Brandt
et al. 2013] can also be naturally considered in CDAPs.
Technically, one-sided matching problems are basic CDAPs with one category. Our char-
acterization of serial dictatorships for basic CDAPs are stronger than characterizations of
serial dictatorships and similar mechanisms for one-sided matching [Svensson 1999; Pa´pai
2000a,b, 2001; Ehlers and Klaus 2003; Hatfield 2009]. This is because the category-wise
neutrality used in our characterization is weaker than the neutrality used in previous work.
Our analysis of the worst-case rank efficiency of categorial sequential allocation mecha-
nisms resembles the price of anarchy [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999], which is defined
for strategic agents together with a social welfare function that numerically evaluates the
quality of outcomes. Our theorem is also related to distortion in the voting setting [Pro-
caccia and Rosenschein 2006; Boutilier et al. 2012], which concerns the social welfare loss
caused by agents reporting a ranking instead of a utility function. Nevertheless, our ap-
proach is significantly different because we focus on allocation problems for myopic and
strategic agents, and we do not assume the existence of agents’ cardinal preferences nor a
social welfare function, even though our theorem can be easily extended to study worst-case
social welfare loss given a social welfare function, as in Proposition 2 through 5.
Finally, there is a literature in social choice on analyzing the outcomes when agents are
myopic [Brams et al. 1998; Lacy and Niou 2000; Brams et al. 2006; Meir et al. 2014]. These
papers focused on voting or cake cutting, while we focus on allocation of indivisible items.
2. CATEGORIZED DOMAIN ALLOCATION PROBLEMS
Definition 1 A categorized domain is composed of p ≥ 1 categories of indivisible items,
denoted by {D1, . . . , Dp}. In a categorized domain allocation problem (CDAP), we want to
allocate the items to n agents without monetary transfer, such that each agent gets at least
one item from each category.
In a basic categorized domain for n agents, for each i ≤ p, |Di| = n, D = D1× · · · ×Dp,
and each agent’s preferences are represented by a linear order over D. In a basic categorized
domain allocation problem (basic CDAP), we want to allocate the items to n agents without
monetary tranfer, such that every agent gets exactly one item from each category.
In this paper, we focus on basic categorized domains and basic CDAPs for non-sharable
items [Chevaleyre et al. 2006], that is, each item can only be allocated to one agent. There-
fore, for all i ≤ p, we write Di = {1, . . . , n}. Each element in D is called a bundle. For
any j ≤ n, let Rj denote a linear order over D and let P = (R1, . . . , Rn) denote the
agents’ (preference) profile. An allocation A is a mapping from {1, . . . , n} to D, such that⋃n
j=1[A(j)]i = Di, where for any j ≤ n and i ≤ p, A(j) is the bundle allocated to agent j
and [A(j)]i is the item in category i allocated to agent j. An allocation mechanism f is a
mapping that takes a profile as input, and outputs an allocation. We use f j(P ) to denote
the bundle allocated to agent j by f for profile P .
We now define three axiomatic properties for allocation mechanisms. The first two prop-
erties are common in the literature [Svensson 1999], and the third is new.
• A direct mechanism f satisfies strategy-proofness if no agent benefits from misreporting
her preferences. That is, for any profile P , any agent j, and any linear order R′j over D,
f j(P ) Rj f j(R′j , R−j), where R−j is composed of preferences of all agents except agent j.• f satisfies non-bossiness if no agent is bossy. An agent is bossy if she can report
differently to change the bundles allocated to some other agents without changing her
own allocation. That is, for any profile P , any agent j, and any linear order R′j over D,
[f j(P ) = f j(R′j , R−j)]⇒ [f(P ) = f(R′j , R−j)].
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• f satisfies category-wise neutrality if after applying a permutation over the items in a
given category the allocation is also permuted in the same way. That is, for any profile P ,
any category i, and any permutation Mi over Di, we have f(Mi(P )) = Mi(f(P )), where
for any bundle ~d ∈ D, Mi(~d) = (Mi([~d]i), [~d]−i).
When there is only one category, category-wise neutrality degenerates to the traditional
neutrality for one-sided matching [Svensson 1999]. When p ≥ 2, category-wise neutrality is
much weaker than the traditional neutrality.
A serial dictatorship is defined by a linear order K over {1, . . . , n} such that agents choose
items in turns according to K. A truthful agent chooses her top-ranked bundle that is still
available in each step.
Example 1 Let n = 3 and p = 2. D = {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3}. Agents’ preferences are as
follows.
R1 = [12  21  32  33  31  22  23  13  11]
R2 = [32  12  21  13  33  11  31  23  22]
R3 = [13  12  11  22  32  21  33  31  23]
Suppose the agents are truthful. Let K = [1  2  3]. In the first round of the serial
dictatorship, agent 1 chooses 12; in the second round, agent 2 cannot choose 32 or 12
because item 2 in D2 is unavailable, so she chooses 21; in the final round, agent 3 chooses
33. 2
3. AN AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION
Theorem 1 For any p ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2, an allocation mechanism for a basic categorized
domain is strategy-proof, non-bossy, and category-wise neutral if and only if it is a serial
dictatorship. Moreover, the three axioms are minimal for characterizing serial dictatorships.
Proof: We first prove four lemmas. The first three lemmas are standard in proving charac-
terizations for serial dictatorships. The last one (Lemma 4) is new, whose proof is the most
involved and heavily relies on the categorial information.
The first lemma (roughly) says that for all strategy-proof and non-bossy mechanisms f
and all profiles P , if every agent j reports a different ranking without enlarging the set
of bundles ranked above f j(P ) (and she can shuffle the bundles ranked above f j(P ) and
she can shuffle the bundles ranked below f j(P )), then the allocation to all agents does not
change in the new profile. This resembles (strong) monotonicity in social choice.
Lemma 1 Let f be a strategy-proof and non-bossy allocation mechanism over a basic cat-
egorized domain with p ≥ 2. For any pair of profiles P and P ′ such that for all j ≤ n,
{~d ∈ D : ~d R′j f j(P )} ⊆ {~d ∈ D : ~d Rj f j(P )}, we have f(P ′) = f(P ).
Proof: We first prove the lemma for the special case where P and P ′ only differ on one
agent’s preferences. Let j be an agent with R′j 6= Rj and {~d ∈ D : ~d R′j f j(P )} ⊆ {~d ∈ D :
~d Rj f j(P )}. We will prove that f j(R′j , R−j) = f j(Rj , R−j).
Suppose for the sake of contradiction f j(R′j , R−j) 6= f j(Rj , R−j). If f j(R′j , R−j) Rj
f j(Rj , R−j) then it means that f is not strategy-proof since j has incentive to report R′j
when her true preferences are Rj . If f
j(Rj , R−j) Rj f j(R′j , R−j) then f j(Rj , R−j) R′j
f j(R′j , R−j), which means that when agent j’s preferences are R
′
j she has incentive to
report Rj ,. This again contradicts the assumption that f is strategy-proof. Therefore
f j(Rj , R−j) = f j(R′j , R−j).
By non-bossiness, f(Rj , R−j) = f(R′j , R−j). The lemma is proved by recursively applying
this argument to j = 1, . . . , n. 
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For any linear order R over D and any bundle ~d ∈ D, we say a linear order R′ is a pushup
of ~d from R, if R′ can be obtained from R by raising the position of ~d while keeping the
relative positions of other bundles unchanged. The next lemma states that for any strategy-
proof and non-bossy mechanism f , if an agent reports her preferences differently by only
pushing up a bundle ~d, then either the allocation to all agents does not change, or she gets
~d.
Lemma 2 Let f be a strategy-proof and non-bossy allocation mechanism over a basic cat-
egorized domain with p ≥ 2. For any profile P , any j ≤ n, any bundle ~d, and any R′j that
is a pushup of ~d from Rj, either (1) f(R
′
j , R−j) = f(R) or (2) f
j(R′j , R−j) = ~d.
Proof: We first prove that f j(R′j , R−j) = f
j(R) or f j(R′j , R−j) = ~d. Suppose on the
contrary that f j(R′j , R−j) is neither f
j(R) nor ~d. If f j(R′j , R−j) Rj f j(R), then f is not
strategy-proof since when agent j’s true preferences are Rj and other agents’ preferences are
R−j , she has incentive to report R′j to make her allocation better. If f
j(R) Rj f j(R′j , R−j),
then since ~d 6= f j(R′j , R−j), we have f j(R) R′j f j(R′j , R−j). In this case when agent j’s
true preferences are R′j and other agents’ preferences are R−j , she has incentive to report
Rj to make her allocation better, which means that f is not strategy-proof. Therefore,
f j(R′j , R−j) = f
j(R) or f j(R′j , R−j) = ~d. If f
j(R′j , R−j) = f
j(Rj , R−j), then by non-
bossiness f(R′j , R−j) = f(R). This completes the proof. 
We next prove that strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and category-wise neutrality alto-
gether imply Pareto-optimality, which states that for any profile P , there does not exist an
allocation A such that all agents prefer their bundles in A to their bundles in f(P ), and
some of them strictly prefer their bundles in A.
Lemma 3 For any basic categorized domains with p ≥ 2, any strategy-proof, non-bossy,
and category-wise neutral allocation mechanism is Pareto optimal.
Proof: We prove the lemma by contradiction. Let f be a strategy-proof, non-
bossy, category-wise neutral, but non-(Pareto optimal) allocation mechanism. Let P =
(R1, . . . , Rn) denote a profile such that f(P ) is Pareto dominated by an allocation A. For
any i ≤ m, let Mi denote the permutation over Di so that for every j ≤ n, [f j(P )]i is per-
muted to [A(j)]i. Let M = (M1, . . . ,Mm). It follows that for all j ≤ n, M(f j(P )) = A(j).
Let R′j denote an arbitrary ranking where A(j) is ranked at the top place, and f
j(P ) is
ranked at the second place if it is different from A(j). Let R∗j denote an arbitrary ranking
where f j(P ) is ranked at the top place, and A(j) is ranked at the second place if it is different
from f j(P ). Let P ′ = (R′1, . . . , R
′
n) and P
∗ = (R∗1, . . . , R
∗
n). P
′ and P ∗ are illustrated as
follows.
P ′ =

R′1 : A
1  f1(P )  Others
...
R′n : A
n  fn(P )  Others

P ∗ =

R∗1 : f
1(P )  A1  Others
...
R∗n : f
n(P )  An  Others

Since A Pareto dominates f(P ), by Lemma 1 we have f(P ′) = f(P ), because for any
j ≤ n, in R′j the only bundle ranked ahead of f j(P ) is A(j), if it is different from f j(P ),
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and A(j) is also ranked ahead of f j(P ) in Rj . By Lemma 1 again we have f(P
∗) = f(P ).
Comparing M(P ′) and P ∗, we observe that the only differences are the orderings among
D\{A(j), f j(P )}. Applying Lemma 1 to P ∗ and M(P ′), we have that f(M(P ′)) = f(P ∗) =
f(P ). However, by category-wise neutrality f(M(P ′)) = M(f(P ′)) = A, which is a contra-
diction. 
The next lemma states that for any strategy-proof and non-bossy allocation mechanism
f , any profile P , and any pair of agents j1, j2, there is no bundle ~c that only contains items
allocated to agent j1 and j2 by f , such that both j1 and j2 prefer ~c to their bundles allocated
by f .
Table I. Proof steps for Lemma 4.
Rˆj1 : ~c  ~a  ~d  ~b  others
Rˆj2 : ~c  ~b  ~a  ~d  others
Other j : fj(P )  others
Step 1
Rˆj1 : ~c  ~a  ~d  ~b  others
R¯j2 : ~c  ~a  ~b  ~d  others
Other j : fj(P )  others
Step 2
R¯j1 : ~c  ~b  ~a  ~d  others
R¯j2 : ~c  ~a  ~b  ~d  others
Other j : fj(P )  others
Step 3
R¯j1 : ~c  ~b  ~a  ~d  others
R˚j2 : ~c  ~a  ~d  ~b  others
Other j : fj(P )  others
Step 4
R˚j1 : ~c  ~a  ~b  ~d  others
R˚j2 : ~c  ~a  ~d  ~b  others
Other j : fj(P )  others
Step 5
R˚j1 : ~c  ~a  ~b  ~d  others
R¯j2 : ~c  ~a  ~b  ~d  others
Other j : fj(P )  others
Step 6
Lemma 4 Let f be a strategy-proof and non-bossy allocation mechanism over a basic cat-
egorized domain with p ≥ 2. For any profile P and any j1 6= j2 ≤ n, let ~a = f j1(P ) and
~b = f j2(P ), there does not exist ~c ∈ {a1, b1} × {a2, b2} × · · · × {ap, bp} such that ~c Rj1 ~a
and ~c Rj2 ~b, where ai is the i-th component of ~a.
Proof: Suppose for the sake of contradiction that such a bundle ~c exists. Let ~d denote the
bundle such that ~c∪ ~d = ~a∪~b. More precisely, for all i ≤ m, {ci, di} = {ai, bi}. For example,
if ~a = 1213, ~b = 2431, and ~c = 1211, then ~d = 2433.
The rest of the proof derives a contradiction by proving the series of observations illus-
trated in Table I. In each step, we prove that the boxed bundles are allocated to agent j1
and agent j2 respectively, and all other agents get their top-ranked bundles.
Step 1. Let Rˆj1 = [~c  ~a  ~d  ~b  others], Rˆj2 = [~c  ~b  ~a  ~d  others], where “others”
represents an arbitrary linear order over the remaining bundles, and for any j 6= j1, j2, let
Rˆj = [f
j(P )  others]. By Lemma 1, f(Pˆ ) = f(P ).
Step 2. Let R¯j2 = [~c  ~a  ~b  ~d  others] be a pushup of ~a from Rˆj2 . We will prove
that f(R¯j2 , Rˆ−j2) = f(Pˆ ) = f(P ). Since R¯j2 is a pushup of ~a from Rˆj2 , by Lemma 2,
f j2(R¯j2 , Rˆ−j2) is either ~a or ~b. We now show that the former case is impossible. Sup-
pose for the sake of contradiction f j2(R¯j2 , Rˆ−j2) = ~a, then f
j1(R¯j2 , Rˆ−j2) cannot be ~c, ~a,
or ~d since otherwise some item will be allocated twice. This means that f(R¯j2 , Rˆ−j2) is
Pareto dominated by the allocation where j1 gets ~d, j2 gets ~c, and all other agents get
their top-ranked bundles. This contradicts the Pareto-optimality of f (Lemma 3). Hence
f j2(R¯j2 , Rˆ−j2) = ~b = f
j2(Pˆ ). By non-bossiness we have f(R¯j2 , Rˆ−j2) = f(Pˆ ) = f(P ).
A:7
Step 3. Let R¯j1 = [~c  ~b  ~a  ~d  others] be a pushup of ~b from Rˆj1 . We will prove that
in f(R¯j1 , R¯j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}), j1 gets ~b, j2 gets ~a, and all other agents get the same items as in
f(P ). Since R¯j1 is a pushup of
~b from Rˆj1 , by Lemma 2, f
j1(R¯j1 , R¯j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}) is either ~a
or ~b. We now show that the former case is impossible. Suppose for the sake of contradiction
that f j1(R¯j1 , R¯j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}) = ~a. By non-bossiness, f
j2(R¯j1 , R¯j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}) = ~b. This means
that f(R¯j1 , R¯j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}) is Pareto-dominated by the allocation where j1 gets ~b, j2 gets ~a,
and all other agents get their top-ranked bundles. This contradicts the Pareto-optimality
of f (Lemma 3).
Step 4. Let R˚j2 = [~c  ~a  ~d  ~b  others] be a pushup of ~d from R¯j2 . By Lemma 1,
f(R¯j1 , R˚j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}) = f(R¯j1 , R¯j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}).
Step 5. Let R˚j1 = [~c  ~a  ~b  ~d  others] be a pushup of ~a from R¯j1 . We will
prove that f(R˚j1 , R˚j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}) = f(R¯j1 , R˚j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}). Since R˚j1 is a pushup of ~a from
R¯j1 , by Lemma 2, f
j1(R˚j1 , R˚j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}) is either ~a or ~b. We now show that the former
case is impossible. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that f j1(R˚j1 , R˚j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}) =
~a. Then in f(R˚j1 , R˚j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}), agent j2 cannot get ~c, ~a, or ~d, which means that
f(R˚j1 , R˚j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}) is Pareto-dominated by the allocation where j1 gets ~c, j2 gets ~d,
and all other agents get their top-ranked bundles. This contradicts the Pareto-optimality
of f . Hence, f j1(R˚j1 , R˚j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}) = ~b. By non-bossiness f(R˚j1 , R˚j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}) =
f(R¯j1 , R˚j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}).
Step 6. We note that R˚j1 is a pushup of
~b from Rˆj1 (and
~b is still below ~a). By Lemma 1,
f(R˚j1 , R¯j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}) = f(Rˆj1 , R¯j2 , Rˆ−{j1,j2}). We note that the right hand side is the profile
in Step 2.
Contradiction. Finally, the observations in Step 5 and Step 6 imply that when agents’
preferences are as in Step 6, agent j2 has incentive to report R˚j2 in Step 5 to improve
the bundle allocated to her (from ~b to ~a). This contradicts the strategy-proofness of f and
completes the proof of Lemma 4. 
It is easy to check that any serial dictatorship satisfies strategy-proofness, non-bossiness
and category-wise neutrality. We now prove that any mechanism satisfying the three axioms
must be a serial dictatorship. Let R∗ be a linear order over D that satisfies the following
conditions:
• (1, . . . , 1)  (2, . . . , 2)  · · ·  (n, . . . , n).
• For any j < n, the bundles ranked between (j, . . . , j) and (j + 1, . . . , j + 1) are those
satisfying the following two conditions: 1) at least one component is j, and 2) all components
are in {j, j+1, . . . , n}. Let Bj denote these bundles. That is, Bj ⊆ D and Bj = {~d : ∀l, dl ≥
j and ∃l′, dl′ = j}.
• For any j and any ~d,~e ∈ Bj , if the number of j’s in ~d is strictly larger than the number
of j’s in ~e, then ~d  ~e.
The next claim states that f agrees with a serial dictatorship on a specific profile.
Claim 1 Let P ∗ = (R∗, . . . , R∗). For any l ≤ n, there exists jl ≤ n such that f jl(P ∗) =
(l, . . . , l).
Proof: The claim is proved by induction on l. When l = 1, for the sake of contradiction
suppose there is no jl with f
jl(P ∗) = (1, . . . , 1). Then there exist a pair of agents j and j′
such that both ~a = f j(P ∗) and ~b = f j
′
(P ∗) contain 1 in at least one category.
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Let ~c be the bundle obtained from ~a by replacing items in categories where ~b takes 1 to
1. More precisely, we let ~c = (c1, . . . , cp), where
ci =
 1 if ai = 1 or bi = 1ai otherwise
It follows that in R∗, ~c R∗ ~a and ~c R∗ ~b since the number of 1’s in ~c is strictly larger
than the number of 1’s in ~a or ~b. By Lemma 4, this contradicts the assumption that f is
strategy-proof and non-bossy. Hence there exists j1 ≤ n with f j1(P ∗) = (1, . . . , 1).
Suppose the claim is true for l ≤ l′. We next prove that there exists jl′+1 such that
f jl′+1(P ∗) = (l′ + 1, . . . , l′ + 1). This follows after a similar reasoning to the l = 1 case.
Formally, suppose for the sake of contradiction there does not exist such a jl′+1. Then,
there exist two agents who get ~a and ~b in f(P ∗) such that both ~a and ~b contain l′ + 1 in
at least one category. By the induction hypothesis, items {1, . . . , l′} in all categories have
been allocated, which means that all components of ~a and ~b are at least as large as l′ + 1.
Let ~c be the bundle obtained from ~a by replacing items in all categories where ~b takes l′+ 1
to l′ + 1. We have ~c R∗ ~a and ~c R∗ ~b, leading to a contradiction by Lemma 4. Therefore,
the claim holds for l = l′ + 1. This completes the proof of Claim 1. 
W.l.o.g. we let j1 = 1, j2 = 2, . . ., jn = n denote the agents in Claim 1. For any profile
P ′ = (R′1, . . . , R
′
n), we define n bundles as follows. Let
~d1 denote the top-ranked bundle
in R′1, and for any l ≥ 2, let ~dl denote agent l’s top-ranked available bundle given that
items in ~d1, . . . , ~dl−1 have already been allocated. That is, ~dl is the most preferred bundle
in {~d : ∀l′ < l, ~d ∩ ~dl′ = ∅} according to R′l. In other words, ~d1, . . . , ~dn are the bundles
allocated to agents 1 through n by the serial dictatorship 1 2 · · · n. We next prove that
this is exactly the allocation by f .
For any i ≤ m, we define a category-wise permutation Mi such that for all l ≤ n, Mi(l) =
[~dl]i, where we recall that [~dl]i is the item in the i-th category in ~dl. Let M = (M1, . . . ,Mm).
It follows that for all l ≤ n, M(l, . . . , l) = ~dl. By category-wise neutrality and Claim 1, in
f(M(P ∗)) agent l gets M(f l(P ∗)) = ~dl.
Comparing M(P ∗) to P ′, we notice that for all l ≤ n and all bundles ~e, if ~dl M(R∗) ~e
then ~dl R′l ~e. This is because if there exists ~e such that ~dl M(R∗) ~e but ~e R′l ~dl, then
~e is still available after { ~d1, . . . , ~dl−1} have been allocated, and ~e is ranked higher than ~dl
in R′l. This contradicts the selection of
~dl. By Lemma 1, f(P ′) = f(M(P ∗)) = M(f(P ∗)),
which proves that f is the serial dictatorship w.r.t. the order 1 2 · · · n.
Next, we show that strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and category-wise neutrality are a
minimal set of properties that characterize serial dictatorships.
Strategy-proofness is necessary. Consider the allocation mechanism that maximizes
the social welfare w.r.t. the following utility functions. For any i ≤ np and j ≤ n, the
bundle ranked at the i-th position in agent j’s preferences gets (np− i)(1 + ( 12np )j) points.2
It is not hard to check that for any pair of different allocations, the social welfares are
different. It follows that this allocation mechanism satisfies non-bossiness. This is because
if agent j’s allocation is the same when only she reports differently, then the set of items
left to the other agents is the same, which means that the allocation to the other agents
2The ( 1
2np
)j terms in the utility functions are only used to avoid ties in allocations. In fact, any utility
functions where there are no ties satisfy non-bossiness and category-wise neutrality, but some of them are
equivalent to serial dictatorships, which are the cases we want to avoid in our proof.
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by the mechanism is the same. Since the utility of a bundle only depends on its position
in the agents’ preferences rather than the name of the bundle, the allocation mechanism
satisfies category-wise neutrality. This mechanism is not a serial dictatorship. To see this,
consider the basic categorized domain with p = n = 2, R′1 = [11  12  22  21], and
R′2 = [12  21  11  22]. A serial dictatorship will either give 11 to agent 1 and give 22
to agent 2, or give 21 to agent 1 and give 12 to agent 2, but the allocation that maximizes
social welfare w.r.t. the utility function described above is to give 12 to agent 1 and give 21
to agent 2.
Non-bossiness is necessary. Consider the following “conditional serial dictatorship”:
agent 1 chooses her favorite bundle in the first round, and the order over the remaining
agents {2, . . . , n} depends on agent 1’s preferences in the following way: if the first compo-
nent of agent 1’s second-ranked bundle is the same as the first component of her top choice,
then the order over the rest of agents is 2 3 · · · n; otherwise it is n n− 1 · · · 2.
It is not hard to verify that this mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness and category-wise
neutrality, and is not a serial dictatorship (where the order must be fixed before seeing the
profile).
Category-wise neutrality is necessary. Consider the following “conditional serial
dictatorship”: agent 1 chooses her favorite bundle in the first round, and the order over
agents {2, . . . , n} depends on the allocation to agent 1 in the following way: if agent 1
gets (1, . . . , 1), then the order over the rest of agents is 2  3  · · ·  n; otherwise it is
n n− 1 · · · 2. It is not hard to verify that this mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness
and non-bossiness, and is not a serial dictatorship. 
Remarks. The theorem is somewhat negative, meaning that we have to sacrifice one of
strategy-proofness, category-wise neutrality, or non-bossiness. Among the three axiomatic
properties, we feel that non-bossiness is the least natural one.
4. CATEGORIAL SEQUENTIAL ALLOCATION MECHANISMS
Given a linear order O over {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , p}, the categorial sequential allocation
mechanism (CSAM) fO allocates the items in np steps as illustrated in Protocol 1. In each
step t, suppose the t-th element in O is (j, i), (equivalently, t = O−1(j, i)). Agent j is called
the active agent in step t and she chooses an item dj,i that is still available from Di. Then,
dj,i is broadcast to all agents and we move on to the next step.
Protocol 1: Categorial sequential allocation mechanism (CSAM) fO.
Input: An order O over {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , p}.
1 Broadcast O to all agents.
2 for t = 1 to np do
3 Let (j, i) be the t-th element in O.
4 Agent j chooses an available item dj,i ∈ Di.
5 Broadcast dj,i to all agents.
6 end
In CSAMs, in each step the active agent must choose an item from the designated cate-
gory. Hence, CSAMs are different from sequential allocation protocols [Bouveret and Lang
2011] and the draft mechanism [Budish and Cantillon 2012], where in each step the active
agent can choose any available item from any category.
Example 2 The serial dictatorship w.r.t. K = [j1  · · ·  jn] is a CSAM w.r.t. (j1, 1) 
(j1, 2) · · · (j1, p) · · · (jn, 1) (jn, 2) · · · (jn, p).
A:10
For any even number p, given any linear order K = [j1· · ·jn] over the agents, we define
the balanced CSAM to be the mechanism where agents choose items in p phases, such that
for each i ≤ p, in phase i all agents choose from Di w.r.t. K if i is odd, and w.r.t. inverse
K if i is even.
For example, when n = 3, p = 2, and K = [1 2 3], the balanced CSAM uses the order
(1, 1) (2, 1) (3, 1) (3, 2) (2, 2) (1, 2). 2
Similar to sequential allocations [Bouveret and Lang 2011], CSAMs can be implemented in
a distributed manner. Communication cost for CSAMs is much lower than for direct mecha-
nisms, where agents report their preferences in full to the center, which requires Θ(npp log n)
bits per agent, and thus the total communication cost is Θ(np+1p log n). For CSAMs, the
total communication cost of Protocol 1 is Θ(n2p log n+np(n log n)) = Θ(n2p log np), which
has Θ(np−2 · lognlogn+log p ) multiplicative saving. In light of this, CSAMs preserve more privacy
as well.
We will consider two types of myopic agents. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ p, we let Di,t denote the
set of available items in Di at the beginning of round t.
— Optimistic agents. An optimistic agent chooses the item in her top-ranked bundle that is
still available, given the items she chose in previous steps.
— Pessimistic agents. A pessimistic agent j in round t chooses an item dj,i from Di,t, such
that for all d′i ∈ Di,t with d′i 6= dj,i, agent j prefers the worst available bundle whose i-th
component is dj,i to the worst available bundle whose i-th component is d
′
i.
In this paper, we assume that whether an agent is optimistic or pessimistic is fixed before
applying a CSAM.
Example 3 Let n = 3, p = 2. Consider the same profile as in Example 1, which can be
simplified as follows.
Agent 1 (optimistic): 12  21  others  11
Agent 2 (optimistic): 32  others  22
Agent 3 (pessimistic): 13  others  33  31  23
Let O = [(1, 1)  (2, 2)  (3, 1)  (3, 2)  (2, 1)  (1, 2)]. Suppose agent 1 and agent 2
are optimistic and agent 3 is pessimistic. When t = 1, agent 1 (optimistic) chooses item 1
from D1. When t = 2, item 32 is the top-ranked available bundle for agent 2 (optimistic),
so she chooses 2 from D2. When t = 3, the available bundles are {2, 3} × {1, 3}. If agent 3
chooses 2 from D1, then the worst-case available bundle is 23, and if agent 3 chooses 3 from
D1, then the worst-case available bundle is 31. Since agent 3 prefers 31 to 23, she chooses
3 from D1. When t = 4, agent 3 chooses 3 from D2. When t = 5, agent 2 choses 2 from D1
and when t = 6, agent 1 choses 1 from D2. Finally, agent 1 gets 11, agent 2 gets 22, and
agent 3 gets 33. 2
5. RANK EFFICIENCY OF CSAMS FOR MYOPIC AGENTS
In this section, we focus on characterizing the rank efficiency of CSAMs measured by agents’
ranks of the bundles they receive.3 For any linear order R over D and any bundle ~d, we let
Rank(R, ~d) denote the rank of ~d in R, such that the highest position has rank 1 and the
lowest position has rank np. Given a CSAM fO, we introduce the following notation for any
j ≤ n.
• Let Oj denote the linear order over the categories {1, . . . , p} according to which agent
j chooses items from O.
3This is different from the ordinal efficiency for randomized allocation mechanisms [Bogomolnaia and Moulin
2001].
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• For any i ≤ p, let kj,i denote the number of items in Di that are still available right
before agent j chooses from Di. Formally, kj,i = 1 + |{(j′, i) : (j, i)O (j′, i)}|.
• Let Kj denote the smallest index in Oj such that no agent can “interrupt” agent j from
choosing all items in her top-ranked bundle that is available in round (j,Oj(Kj)). Formally,
Kj is the smallest number such that for any l with Kj < l ≤ p, between the round when
agent j chooses an item from category Oj(Kj) and the round when agent j chooses an item
from category Oj(l), no agent chooses an item from category Oj(l). We note that Kj is
defined only by O and is thus independent of agents’ preferences.
Example 4 Let O∗ = [(1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (2, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3)].
That is, fO∗ is a serial dictatorship. Then O∗1 = O∗2 = O∗3 = 1 2 3. K1 = K2 = K3 = 1.
k1,1 = k1,2 = k1,3 = 3, k2,1 = k2,2 = k2,3 = 2, k3,1 = k3,2 = k3,3 = 1.
Let O be the order in Example 3, that is, O = [(1, 1)(2, 2)(3, 1)(3, 2)(2, 1)(1, 2)].
O1 = 1 2. K1 = 2 since (2, 2) is between (1, 1) and (1, 2) in O. k1,1 = 3, k1,2 = 1.
O2 = 2 1. K2 = 2 since (3, 1) is between (2, 2) and (2, 1). k2,1 = 1, k2,2 = 3.
O3 = 1  2. K3 = 1 since between (3, 1) and (3, 2) in O, no agent chooses an item from
D2. k3,1 = k3,2 = 2. 2
Proposition 1 For any CSAM fO, any combination of optimistic and pessimistic agents,
any j ≤ n, and any profile:
— Upper bound for optimistic agents: if j is optimistic, then the rank of the bundle
allocated to her is at most np + 1−∏pl=Kj kj,Oj(l).
— Upper bound for pessimistic agents: if j is pessimistic, then the rank of the bundle
allocated to her is at most np −∑pl=1(kj,Oj(l) − 1).
Proof: Equivalently, we prove that for any optimistic agent, the bundle allocated to her
is ranked no lower than the (
∏p
l=Kj
kj,Oj(l))-th position from the bottom, and for any
pessimistic agent, the bundle allocated to her is ranked no lower than the (1+
∑p
l=1(kj,Oj(l)−
1))-th position from the bottom.
W.l.o.g. let Oj = 1  2  · · · p. That is, agent j chooses items from categories 1, . . . , p
in sequence in the sequential allocation. This means that in this proof, for any l ≤ p,
Oj(l) = l. We first prove the proposition for an optimistic agent j. In the beginning of round
tj = O−1(j,Kj) in Algorithm 1, agent j has already chosen items from D1, . . . , DKj−1, and
is ready to choose an item from DKj . We recall that Dl,t is the set of remaining items
in Dl at the beginning of round t. By definition, kj,l = |Dl,tj |. Let (dj,1, . . . , dj,Kj−1) ∈
D1 × · · · ×DKj−1 denote the items agent j has chosen in previous rounds. It follows that
at the beginning of the round tj , the following
∏p
l=Kj
kj,l bundles are available for agent j:
Dj = (dj,1, . . . , dj,Kj−1)×
p∏
l=Kj
Dl,tj
We now show that an optimistic agent j is guaranteed to obtain her top-ranked bundle
in Dj . Intuitively this holds because by the definition of Kj , for any l ≥ Kj , when it is
agent j’s round to choose an item from Dl, the l-th component of her top-ranked bundle in
Dj is always available. Formally, let ~dj = (dj,1, . . . , dj,p) denote agent j’s top-ranked bundle
in Dj . We prove that agent j will choose dj,l from Dl in round O−1(j, l) by induction on
l. The base case l = Kj is straightforward. Suppose she has chosen dKj , dKj+1, . . . , dl′ for
some l′ ≥ Kj . Then in round O−1(j, l′ + 1) when agent j is about to choose an item from
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Dl′+1, the following bundles are available:
(dj,1, . . . , dj,l′)×
p∏
l=l′+1
Dl,tj
This is because by the induction hypothesis (dj,1, . . . , dj,l′) have been chosen by agent
j in previous rounds. Then, by the definition of Kj , for any l ≥ l′ + 1 no agent
chooses an item from Dl between round tj = O−1(j,Kj) and round O−1(j, l′). Hence
the remaining items in Dl are still the same as those in round tj . This means that
~dj ∈ (dj,1, . . . , dj,l′) ×
∏p
l=l′+1Dl,tj ⊆ Dj . Therefore, ~dj is still agent j’s top-ranked avail-
able bundle in the beginning of round O−1(j, l′), when she is about to choose an item from
Dl′+1. Hence agent j will choose dj,l′+1. This proves the claim for l = l
′ + 1, which means
that it holds for all l ≤ p. Therefore, agent j is allocated ~dj by the sequential allocation
protocol. We note that |Dj | =
∏p
l=Kj
kj,l. This proves the proposition for optimistic agents.
We next prove the proposition for an pessimistic agent j. Let ~dj = (dj,1, . . . , dj,p) denote
her allocation by the sequential allocation protocol. Since agent j is pessimistic, for any
1 ≤ l ≤ p, in round t∗ = O−1(j, l) agent j chose dj,l from Dl,t∗ , we must have that for all
d′l ∈ Dl,t∗ with d′l 6= dj,l, there exists a bundle (dj,1, . . . , dj,l−1, d′l, . . . , d′p) that is ranked
below ~dj . These bundles are all different and the number of all such bundles is
∑p
l=1(kj,l−1),
which proves the proposition for pessimistic agents. 
We note that Proposition 1 works for any combination of optimistic and pessimistic
agents, which is much more general than the setting with all-optimistic agents and the
setting with all-pessimistic agents. In addition, once the CSAM and the properties of the
agents (that is, whether each agent is optimistic or pessimistic) is given, the bounds hold
for all preference profiles.
Our main theorem in this section states that, surprisingly, for all combinations of opti-
mistic and pessimistic agents, all upper bounds described in Proposition 1 can be matched in
a same profile. Even more surprisingly, for the same profile there exists an allocation where
almost all agents get their top-ranked bundle, and the only agent who may not get her
top-ranked bundle gets her second-ranked bundle. Therefore, the theorem not only provides
a worst-case analysis in the absolute sense in that all upper bounds in Proposition 1 are
matched in the same profile, but also in the comparative sense w.r.t. the optimal allocation
of the profile.
Theorem 2 For any CSAM fO and any combination of optimistic and pessimistic agents,
there exists a profile P such that for all j ≤ n:
(1 ) if agent j is optimistic, then the rank of the bundle allocated to her is np + 1 −∏p
l=Kj
kj,Oj(l);
(2 ) if agent j is pessimistic, then the rank of the bundle allocated to her is np −∑p
l=1(kj,Oj(l) − 1);
(3 ) there exists an allocation where at least n− 1 agents get their top-ranked bundles, and
the remaining agent gets her top-ranked or second-ranked bundle.
The proof is quite involved and can be found in the supplementary material.
Example 5 The profile in Example 3 is an example of the profile guaranteed by Theorem 2:
agent 1 (optimistic) gets her bottom bundle (K1 = 2 and k1,2 = 1), agent 2 (optimistic)
gets her bottom bundle (K2 = 2 and k2,1 = 1), and agent 3 (pessimistic) gets her third
bundle (k3,1 = k3,2 = 2). Moreover, there exists an allocation where agent 2 and agent 3
get their top bundles and agent 1 gets her second bundle. 2
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Theorem 2 can be used to compare various CSAMs with optimistic and pessimistic agents
w.r.t. worst-case utilitarian rank and worst-case egalitarian rank.
Definition 2 Given any CSAM fO and any n, the worst-case utilitarian rank
is maxPn
∑
Rj∈Pn Rank(Rj , f
j
O(Pn)), and the worst-case egalitarian rank is
maxPn maxRj∈Pn Rank(Rj , f
j
O(Pn)), where Pn is a profile of n agents.
In words, the worst-case utilitarian rank is the worst (largest) total rank of the bundles
(w.r.t. respective agent’s preferences) allocated by fO. The worst-case egalitarian rank is
the worst (largest) rank of the least-satisfied agent, which is also a well-accepted measure
of fairness. The worst case is taken over all profiles of n agents.
Proposition 2 Among all CSAMs, serial dictatorships with all-optimistic agents have the
best (smallest) worst-case utilitarian rank and the worst (largest) worst-case egalitarian
rank.
Proof: The worst-case egalitarian rank of any serial dictatorship is np when all agents have
the same preferences. To prove the optimality of worst-case utilitarian rank, given fO, we
consider the multiset composed of the numbers of items in the designated category that the
active agent can choose in each step. That is, we consider the multiset RI = {kj,l : ∀j ≤
n, l ≤ p}. Since in each step in the execution of fO, only one item is allocated, RI is composed
of p copies of {1, . . . , n}. Since for each agent j, (1 +∑pl=1(kj,Oj(l)− 1)) ≤∏pl=1 kj,Oj(l) (we
note that in the right hand side, l starts with 1 but not Kj), the best worst-case utilitarian
rank is at least n(np+1)−∑nj=1∏pl=1 kj,Oj(l) ≥ n(np+1)−∑nj=1 jp. It is not hard to verify
that this lower bound is achieved by any serial dictatorship with all-optimistic agents. 
Proposition 3 Any CSAM with all-optimistic agents has the worst (largest) worst-case
egalitarian rank, which is np.
Proof: By Theorem 2, the proposition is equivalent to the existence of an agent j such
that for all l ≥ Kj , kj,Oj(l) = 1. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume the following
condition:
Condition (*): for every agent j, there exists l ≥ Kj such that kj,Oj(l) > 1.
Let O(np) = (jn, ip). It follows that kjn,ip = 1 because there is only one item left. By
condition (*), there exists ip−1 with Kn ≤ O−1jn (ip−1) such that kjn,ip−1 > 1. Let jn−1
denote the agent who is the last to choose an item from category ip−1. We have jn−1 6= jn,
because agent n is not the last agent to choose an item from category ip−1. By definition, we
have kjn−1,ip−1 = 1. Moreover, (jn−1,Ojn−1(Kjn−1))O (jn, ip−1)O (jn,Ojn(Kjn)), which
simply states that jn−1 chooses an item from category Ojn−1(Kjn−1) after jn chooses an
item from category ip−1 (the second half of the inequality is due to the way we choose ip−1).
This inequality holds because if agent jn−1 chooses an item from category Ojn−1(Kjn−1)
before agent jn chooses an item from category ip−1, then agent jn “interrupts” agent jn−1
from choosing an item from category ip−1, which contradicts the definition of Kjn−1 .
By condition (*), there exists ip−2 such that Kjn−1 ≤ O−1jn−1(ip−2) and kjn−1,ip−2 >
1. Similarly, we can define jn−2, prove that jn−2 6= jn−1 and (jn−2,Ojn−2(Kjn−2)) O
(jn−1, ip−2)O (jn−1,Ojn−1(Kjn−1)).
However, this process cannot continue forever, since otherwise we will obtain an infinite
sequence in O: (jn,Ojn(Kjn))O (jn−1,Ojn−1(Kjn−1))O (jn−2,Ojn−2(Kjn−2))O · · · , but
np is finite. This leads to a contradiction. 
Proposition 4 For any even number p, the worst-case egalitarian rank of any balanced
CSAM (defined in Example 2) with all-pessimistic agents is np − (n− 1)p/2. These are the
CSAMs with the best worst-case egalitarian rank among CSAMs with all-pessimistic agents.
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Proof: For any balanced CSAM, it is not hard to see that for any agent j, Oj = 1 · · ·p.
For any l < p/2 and any j ≤ n, we have kj,2l−1+kj,2l = n+1. Since all agents are pessimistic,
by part 2 of Theorem 2, their worst-case ranks are all equal to np−(n−1)p/2. The optimality
of balanced CSAMs comes from the fact that for any categorial sequential mechanisms∑
j,l kj,l = (n+1)np/2. Therefore, there must exist an agent j
∗ with
∑p
l=1 kj,l ≤ (n+1)p/2.

A natural question after Proposition 4 is: do the balanced CSAMs with all-pessimistic
agents have optimal worst-case egalitarian rank, among all CSAMs for any combination of
optimistic and pessimistic agents? The answer is negative.
Proposition 5 For any even number p with 2p > 1+(n−1)p/2, there exists a CSAM with
both optimistic and pessimistic agents, whose worst-case egalitarian rank is strictly better
(smaller) than np − (n− 1)p/2.
Proof: We prove the proposition by explicitly constructing such a mechanism. The idea
is, agents {1, . . . , n − 1} choose the items as in a balanced CSAM for n − 1 agents, then
we let agent n “interrupt” them and choose all items in consecutive p rounds right before
their last iteration, i.e. the last (n − 1) round. Then, we let agents 1 through n − 1 be
optimistic and let agent n be pessimistic. For example, when n = 3 and p = 4, the order is
(1, 1) (2, 1) (2, 2) (1, 2) (1, 3) (2, 3) (3, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4) (2, 4) (1, 4).
Agent 1 and agent 2 are optimistic and agent 3 is pessimistic.
By part 2 of Theorem 2, for any agent j ≤ n−1, the worst-case rank is np+1−(1+np/2).
By part 1 of Theorem 2, the worst-case rank for agent n is np + 1 − 2p. This proves the
proposition. 
6. RANK EFFICIENCY OF CSAMS FOR STRATEGIC AGENTS
When all agents are strategic and have complete and perfect information, the CSAM natu-
rally corresponds to an extensive-form game, for which we will focus on the subgame-perfect
Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), which is unique because agents’ preferences are linear orders.
Example 6 Let n = p = 2. Two agents’ preferences are R1 = [22  12  11  21] and
R2 = [12  11  22  21]. Let O = (1, 1)  (2, 2)  (2, 1)  (1, 2). Suppose both agents
are strategic and have complete and perfect information. The game tree and backward
induction for SPNE are illustrated in Figure 1 (a). When t = 3, 4, the active agent only has
one choice. When t = 2, on the left tree agent 2 chooses item 2 from D2 because she prefers
22 to 21; on the right tree agent 2 chooses item 2 from D2 because she prefers 12 to 11.
When t = 1, agent 1 chooses item 1 from D1 because she prefers 11 to 21. 2
Proposition 6 Suppose all agents are strategic and have complete and perfect information.
For any CSAM fO, any j ≤ n, and any profile, the rank of the bundle allocated to agent j
in the SPNE is at most np + 1−∏i≤p kj,i.
Proof: For any j ≤ n and t ≤ np, we define Aj,t recursively as follows. For all j, Aj,np = 1.
For any 2 ≤ t ≤ np, suppose O(t) = (j, i). We let Aj,t−1 = kj,i × Aj,t and for any j′ 6= j,
we let Aj′,t−1 = Aj′,t.
We next prove by induction that for any nodeN (corresponding to step t) in the backward
induction tree of the extensive-form game of fO, any j ≤ n, and any t ≤ np, there are at
least Aj,t − 1 bundles at the leaves of the subtree rooted at N that are ranked below the
bundle agent j chooses at the node w.r.t. agent j’s preferences.
The case for all nodes with t = np naturally holds. Supposing the claim holds for all
nodes with 2 ≤ t′ ≤ np, we next show that it also holds for all nodes with t′ − 1. For any
node N with t′ − 1, let agent j denote the agent who will chose an item from category
i. By definition, agent j has kj,i choices, which corresponds to the kj,i subtrees of N .
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Fig. 1. (a) Extensitve-form game in Example 6. (b) Illustration of proof for Proposition 6.
Let B = {b1 . . . bkj,i} denote these bundles from subtree 1 through kj,i respectively. See
Figure 1 (b) for illustration. By the induction hypothesis, for each subtree l, there are at
least Aj,t′−1 bundles ranked below bl. Because agent j will choose her most preferred bundle
in B, w.l.o.g. let it be b1, there are at least kj,i(Aj,t′−1)+kj,i−1 = Aj,t′−1−1 bundles ranked
below b1 among all bundles for j in the leaves of N . For any other agent j′, her allocation
is the same as in subtree 1, which means that there are at least Aj′,t′ − 1 = Aj′,t′−1 − 1
bundles in the leaves of subtree 1 ranked below the bundle allocated to her at N . This
proves that the claim holds for all t.
The proposition follows after the observation that for any j ≤ n, Aj,1 =
∏
i≤p kj,i. 
The next proposition shows that when there are two agents, for any p and any CSAM,
the bounds in Proposition 6 can be reached in a same profile. The proof is by construction
and is relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 7 When n = 2, both agents are strategic, and have complete and perfect
information. For any CSAM fO, there exists a profile P such that for j = 1, 2, the rank of
the bundle allocated to agent j is np + 1−∏i≤p kj,i.
7. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we use computer simulations to evaluate expected efficiency of categorial
sequential mechanisms, when agents’ preferences are generated i.i.d. from a well-known
statistical model called the Mallows model [Mallows 1957]. In a Mallows model, we are
given a dispersion parameter 0 < ϕ ≤ 1, and for any ground truth ranking W and any
ranking V , we have Pr(V |W ) = 1Z · ϕKendall(V,W ), where Kendall(V,W ) is the Kendall-
tau distance between V and W , defined to be the number of different pairwise comparisons
between alternatives and Z is the normalization factor. In the Mallows model, the dispersion
parameter measures the centrality of the generated linear orders. The smaller ϕ is, the more
centralized the randomly generated linear orders are (around the ground truth linear order).
When ϕ = 1, the Mallows model degenerates to the uniform distribution for any ground
truth linear order W .
Data generation. We fix p = 2, let n range from 2 to 11, and let ϕ be 0.1, 0.5, and 1.
For each setting, we first randomly generate a linear order W over D, and then use it as
the ground truth in the Mallows model to generate n agents’ preferences. For each setting
we generate 2000 datasets and use them to approximately compute the expected utilitarian
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rank and the expected egalitarian rank, defined by replacing maxPn by EPn in Definition 2.
4
We evaluate serial dictatorships and balanced CSAMs with two configurations of agents:
all-optimistic agents and all-pessimistic agents. All computations were done on a 1.8 GHz
Intel Core i7 laptop with 4GB memory.
Results. The results for ϕ = 0.5 are shown in Figure 2, where we also plot 95% confidence
intervals. Results for other ϕ’s are similar. We observe that in general, serial dictatorships
with all-optimistic agents have the best (smallest) expected utilitarian rank, and balanced
CSAMs with all-pessimistic agents have the best (smallest) expected egalitarian rank. All
these comparisons are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. These observations are inci-
dentally consistent with the worst-case results obtained in Section 5.
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Fig. 2. The data are generated from the Mallows model with ϕ = 0.5.
8. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we propose CDAPs to model allocation problems for indivisible and catego-
rized items without monetary transfer, when agents have heterogenous and combinatorial
preferences. We characterize serial dictatorships for basic CDAPs, propose CSAMs and
characterize worst-case rank efficiency for CSAMs with any combination of optimistic and
pessimistic agents, which leads to characterizations of utilitarian rank and egalitarian rank
of various CSAMs. We provide an upper bound on the rank efficiency for CSAMs with
strategic agents and a matching lower bound for the case of two agents. We also performed
some preliminary simulations to compare the expected ranks of various CSAMs.
There are many open questions and directions for future research, including proving a
matching bound on the rank efficiency for n > 2 strategic agents, analyzing the outcomes
and rank efficiency for CSAMs for other types of agents, e.g. minimax-regret agents. We
also plan to work on theoretical analysis of the expected utilitarian rank and egalitarian
rank for randomized allocation mechanisms. For general CDAPs, we are excited to explore
generalizations of CP-nets [Boutilier et al. 2004], LP-trees [Booth et al. 2010], and soft con-
straints [Pozza et al. 2011] for preference representation. Based on these new languages we
can analyze fairness and computational aspects of CSAMs and other mechanisms. Mecha-
nism design for CDAPs with sharable, non-sharable, and divisible items is also an important
and promising topic for future research.
4The expected egalitarian rank should be distinguished from the egalitarian expected rank, which first
computes the expected rank for every agent, then chooses the largest (expected) rank.
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Appendix: Full Proofs
8.1. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: Given O and the information on whether each agent j is optimistic or pessimistic,
we will construct a profile P such that in fO(P ), for all j ≤ n, agent j obtains (j, . . . , j).
We prove the theorem in the following three steps:
— Step 1: define bottom bundles. We specify a set of bundles that are ranked in the
bottom positions for each agent j, and require (j, . . . , j) to be ranked on the top of them.
— Step 2: define top bundles. We specify top-1 and sometimes also top-2 bundles for
each agent.
— Step 3: extend to full profile. We take a profile that extends the partial orders
constructed in the first two steps, and then show that it satisfies all three properties in
the theorem.
The construction is summarized in Table II (for optimistic agents) and Table III (for pes-
simistic agents).
Table II. Partial preferences for an optimistic agent j. BottomBundlesOptj is defined in (1). “Others in
BottomBundlesOptj ” refers to [BottomBundles
Opt
j \ {(j, . . . , j)}].
Optimistic agent Order
j 6= j1
case 1: Kj = 1 ([Predi1 (j)]i1 , [j]−i1 )  · · ·  (j, . . . , j)  others in BottomBundlesOptj
case 2: Kj > 1
([Predi1 (j)]i1 , [j]−i1 )  ([PredOj(Kj)(j)]Oj(Kj), [j]−Oj(Kj))
 · · ·  (j, . . . , j)  others in BottomBundlesOptj
j = j1
case 1: Kj = 1 (j1, . . . , j1)  ([Li1 (n)]i1 , [j1]−i1 )  others
case 2: Kj > 1
([PredOj(Kj)(j1)]Oj(Kj), [j1]−Oj(Kj))  ([Li1 (n)]i1 , [j1]−i1 )
 · · ·  (j1, . . . , j1)  others in BottomBundlesOptj1
Table III. Partial preferences for a pessimistic agent j. BottomBundlesPesj is defined in (2). For j 6=
j1, “others in BottomBundlesPesj ” refers to (BottomBundles
Pes
j1
\ {(j, . . . , j)}). For j = j1, “others in
BottomBundlesPesj1 ” refers to (BottomBundles
Pes
j1
\ {(j1, . . . , j1), ([Li1 (n)]i1 , [j1]−i1 )}).
Pessimistic agent Order
j 6= j1 ([Predi1 (j)]i1 , [j]−i1 )  · · ·  (j, . . . , j)  others in BottomBundlesPesj
j = j1
([Li1 (n)]i1 , [j1]−i1 )  · · ·  (j1, . . . , j1)  others in BottomBundlesPesj1
 (Li1 (n), . . . , Li1 (n))
We first introduce some notation that will be useful to define the profile in Step 1 and
Step 2. Let O(1) = (j1, i1). That is, agent j1 is the first to choose an item in the sequential
allocation, and she chooses from category Di1 . Let Li1 denote the order over {1, . . . , n}
representing the order for the agents to choose items from Di1 in O. That is, j Li1 j′ if
and only if (j, i1) O (j′, i1). By definition we have j1 = Li1(1). For any j ≤ n, we let
Predi1(j) = Li1(L
−1
i1
(j) − 1) denote the predecessor of agent j in Li1 , that is, the latest
agent who chose an item from category i1 before agent j chooses from category i1. If j = 1,
then we let the last agent in Li1 be her predecessor, that is, Predi1(1) = Li1(n).
Step 1: define bottom bundles. In order to match the upper bounds shown in the proof
of Proposition 1, the bundles described in the proof of Proposition 1 must be the only
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bundles that are ranked below (j, . . . , j) by agent j. This is the part of the profile we will
construct in the first step.
For all i and t, we first define D∗i,t to be the subset of Di = {1, . . . , n} such that q ∈ D∗i,t
if and only if agent q has not chosen an item from Di before the t-th round. By definition,
if O(t) = (j, i) then j ∈ D∗i,t. Formally,
D∗i,t = {q ≤ n : O−1(q, i) ≥ t}
We note that D∗i,t is defined solely by i, t, and O, which means that it does not depend on
agents’ preferences and behavior in previous rounds. Later in this proof we will show that
for our constructed profile, in each round (j, i) the active agent j will choose j from Di, so
that D∗i,t is the remaining items for category i at the beginning of round t of the sequential
allocation.
For any 1 ≤ l ≤ p, we let t∗j,l = O−1(j,Oj(l)). That is, t∗j,l is the round where agent j
chooses an item from the l-th category in Oj , which is not necessarily category l. For each
agent j we specify their bottom bundles as follows.
— If agent j is optimistic, then we let the following bundles be ranked in the bottom of her
preferences:
BottomBundlesOptj =
(jOj(1), . . . , jOj(Kj−1))×
p∏
l=Kj
D∗Oj(l),t∗j,l ,
(1)
where (j, . . . , j) is ranked on the top of these bundles, and the order over the remaining
bundles is defined arbitrarily. It follows that (j, . . . , j) is ranked in the (
∏p
l=Kj
kj,Oj(l))-th
position from the bottom by agent j.
— If agent j is pessimistic, then we first define the following bundles:
BottomBundlesPesj =
p⋃
l=1
⋃
d∈D∗Oj(l),t∗j,l
{([d]Oj(l), [j]−Oj(l))},
(2)
where [j]−Oj(l) means that all components except the Oj(l)-th component is j. Bundles
in BottomBundlesPesj are (partially) ranked as follows: first, (j, . . . , j) is ranked on the
top; then, for any 1 ≤ l1 < l2 ≤ p and any d1 ∈ D∗Oj(l1),t∗j,l1 and d2 ∈ D
∗
Oj(l2),t∗j,l2
with
d1 6= j and d2 6= j, we rank ([d1]Oj(l1), [j]−Oj(l1)) below ([d2]Oj(l2), [j]−Oj(l2)).
— If j 6= j1, then we simply let BottomBundlesPesj (with the partial orders specified
above) be the bundles ranked in the bottom position.
— If j = j1, then we move ([Predi1(j)]i1 , [j]−i1) = ([Li1(n)]i1 , [j1]−i1) to the bottom
place and replace it by (Predi1(j), . . . , P redi1(j)) = (Li1(n), . . . , Li1(n)), and then let
these be ranked in the bottom positions of agent j’s preferences. That is, the bottom
bundles are: (j1, . . . , j1)  (BottomBundlesPesj \ {(j1, . . . , j1), ([Li1(n)]i1 , [j1]−i1)}) 
(Li1(n), . . . , Li1(n))
In both cases (j, . . . , j) is ranked at the (1 +
∏p
l=Kj
(kj,Oj(l) − 1))-th position from the
bottom.
Step 2: define top bundles. We now specify the top two bundles (sometimes only the top
bundle) for optimistic agents, and show that they are compatible with our constructions in
Step 1. For any optimistic agent j:
— When j 6= j1, there are following two cases:
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— case 1: Kj = 1. We let ([Predi1(j)]i1 , [j]−i1) be the top-ranked bundle of agent j.
— case 2: Kj > 1. We let ([Predi1(j)]i1 , [j]−i1) be the top-ranked bundle of agent j.
Moreover, if i1 6= Oj(Kj), then we rank ([PredOj(Kj)(j)]Oj(Kj), [j]−Oj(Kj)) at the
second position. We recall that PredOj(Kj)(j) is the predecessor of j in LOj(Kj), the
order for the agents to choose items from DOj(Kj).
These do not conflict with the preferences specified in Step 1 because item Predi1(j) in
Di1 is not available for agent j when she is about to choose an item in Di1 , and item
PredOj(Kj)(j) in DOj(Kj) is not available for agent j when she is about to choose an
item in DOj(Kj). Hence, none of these bundles are in BottomBundles
Opt
j .
— When j = j1, there are the following two cases:
— case 1: Kj = 1. Since (j1, i1) = O(1), for all i, D∗i,O−1(j,i) = Di, which means that
agent j is guaranteed to get her top-ranked bundle after the sequential allocation. In
this case we let (j, . . . , j) be agent j’s top-ranked bundle and let ([Li1(n)]i1 , [j]−i1)
be ranked in agent j’s second position. These do not conflict with the preferences
specified in Step 1 because in this case Step 1 only specifies that (j, . . . , j) be ranked
in the top position.
— case 2: Kj > 1. We rank ([PredOj(Kj)(j)]Oj(Kj), [j]−Oj(Kj)) at the top position.
We then rank ([Li1(n)]i1 , [j]−i1) at the second position. Since i1 = Oj(1), we
have Oj(Kj) 6= i1, otherwise Kj = 1. Hence, ([PredOj(Kj)(j)]Oj(Kj), [j]−Oj(Kj)) 6=
([Li1(n)]i1 , [j]−i1). These do not conflict with the preferences specified in Step 1 be-
cause category i1 is agent j1’s first category in Oj1 , which means that i1 < Kj ,
thus ([Li1(n)]i1 , [j]−i1) 6∈ BottomBundlesOptj1 ; also PredOj(Kj)(j) is not available
when agent j1 is about to choose an item for category Oj(Kj), which means that
([PredOj(Kj)(j)]Oj(Kj), [j]−Oj(Kj)) 6∈ BottomBundlesOptj1 .
For any pessimistic agent j, we simply let her top-ranked bundle be ([Predi1(j)]i1 , [j]−i1)
(we recall that Predi1(j1) = Li1(n)). We claim that preferences specified in the second step
do not conflict with preferences specified in the first step for bottom bundles.
— If j 6= j1, then we need to show that ([Predi1(j)]i1 , [j]−i1) 6∈ BottomBundlesPesj . When
agent j is about to choose her item from Di1 , agent Predi1(j) has already chosen her
item from Di1 , which means that Predi1(j) is unavailable for agent j. This means that
([Predi1(j)]i1 , j−i1) 6∈ BottomBundlesPesj .
— If j = j1, then by definition (see Table III) ([Li1(n)]i1 , [j1]−i1) is replaced by
(Li1(n), . . . , Li1(n)) in BottomBundles
Pes
j1
, which means that it can be ranked in the
top.
Step 3: extend to full profile. For any j, let Rj be an arbitrary linear order over D
that satisfies all constraints defined in the previous two steps (see Table II and III). Let
P = (R1, . . . , Rn).
We now show by induction on the round in the sequential allocation mechanism, denoted
by t, that if we apply the sequential allocation O to P , then for all j ≤ n, agent j gets
(j, . . . , j).
When t = 1, agent j1 chooses an item from Di1 . If j1 is optimistic, then it is not hard
to check that the i1-th component of the top-ranked bundle of Rj1 is j1 (the top-ranked
bundles are (j, . . . , j) and ([j′]Oj(Kj), [j]−Oj(Kj)), for case 1 (Kj1 = 1) and case 2 (Kj1 > 1),
respectively. If agent j1 is pessimistic, then for any d ∈ Di1 with d 6= j1, there exists a
bundle whose i1th component is d and is ranked below any bundle whose i1th component
is j1. More precisely, if d 6= Predi1(j1) = Li1(n), then such a bundle is ([d]i1 , [j]−i1);
if d = Predi1(j1) = Li1(n), then such a bundle is (Li1(n), . . . , Li1(n)). In both cases a
pessimistic agent j1 will choose item j1 from Di1 .
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Suppose in every round before round t, the active agent j chose item j from the designated
category. Let O(t) = (j, i). If j is optimistic, then we show in the following four cases that
she will choose item j from Di in round t.
— j 6= j1, Kj = 1. In this case j is guaranteed to get her top-ranked available bundle. It is
not hard to check that the available bundles are a subset of BottomBundlesOptj , where
(j, . . . , j) is available and is ranked in the top. Therefore agent j will choose item j.
— j 6= j1, Kj > 1. There are the following cases:
(1) Agent Predi1(j) has not chosen her item from Di1 . In this case the top-ranked
bundle ([Predi1(j)]i1 , [j]−i1) is still available by the induction hypothesis.
(2) Agent Predi1(j) has chosen an item from Di1 and PredOj(Kj)(j) has not chosen
her item from DOj(Kj). By the induction hypothesis, agent Predi1(j) chose item
Predi1(j) from category Di1 , which means that ([Predi1(j)]i1 , [j]−i1) is unavail-
able. The bundle ([PredOj(Kj)(j)]Oj(Kj), [j]−Oj(Kj)) becomes the top-ranked avail-
able bundle due to the induction hypothesis, whose j-th component is j.
(3) Predi1(j) has chosen item Predi1(j) from Di1 and PredOj(Kj)(j) has chosen her
item from DOj(Kj). In this case, we first claim that O−1j (i) ≥ Kj . For the sake
of contradiction suppose O−1j (i) < Kj . Then, by the definition of PredOj(Kj), no
agent chooses an item from DOj(Kj) between round O−1j (i) and t∗j,Kj . We recall
that t∗j,Kj is the round when agent j chooses an item from DOj(Kj). However, this
violates the minimality of Kj since no agent chooses an item from DOj(Kj) between
round t∗j,Kj−1 > O−1j (i) and t∗j,Kj . Hence, we must have that O−1j (i) ≥ Kj . By the
induction hypothesis, the available bundles are a subset of BottomBundlesOptj and
(j, . . . , j) is still available and is ranked at the top, which means that agent j will
choose item j from Di.
In all three cases above, the ith component of the top-ranked available bundle is j, which
means that agent j will choose item j.
— j = j1, Kj = 1. By the induction hypothesis, the top-ranked bundle (j, . . . , j) is still
available, which means that agent j will choose item j.
— j = j1, Kj > 1. If agent PredOj(Kj)(j) has not chosen her item from DOj(Kj), then by the
induction hypothesis the top bundle ([PredOj(Kj)(j)]Oj(Kj), [j]−Oj(Kj)) is still available
and i 6= Oj(Kj). If agent PredOj(Kj)(j) has chosen item PredOj(Kj)(j) from DOj(Kj),
then by the induction hypothesis the available bundles are a subset of BottomBundlesOptj
with (j, . . . , j) ranked at the top. In both cases the ith component of the top-ranked
available bundle is j. Therefore agent j will choose item j.
If agent j is pessimistic, then by the induction hypothesis the available items in Di are
D∗i,t, and j ∈ D∗i,t. For any d ∈ D∗i,t with d 6= j, ([d]i, [j]−i) is still available and is ranked
lower than any available bundle whose i-th component is j in BottomBundlesPesj . Therefore,
a pessimistic agent j will choose item j in this round.
It follows that after the sequential allocation, for all j ≤ n, agent j gets (j, . . . , j). It is
not hard to verify that conditions 1 and 2 hold.
To show that condition 3 holds, consider the allocation where agent j gets
([Predi1(j)]i1 , [j]−i1). In this allocation, all agents except j1 get their top-ranked bundle,
and j1 gets her top-ranked bundle (if j1 is pessimistic) or second-ranked bundle (if j1 is
optimistic). This proves the theorem. 
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8.2. Proof of Proposition 7
Proof: We construct P by induction on p. When p = 1 the proposition obviously holds.
Suppose the proposition holds for p′. For any CSAM fO for p′+ 1 categories, w.l.o.g. in the
first round agent 1 chooses from category p′ + 1. Let O′ denote the order over categories
1, . . . , p′ in O. O′ is well-defined because once agent 1 chooses an item from Dp′+1, agent
2’s item from Dp′+1 is determined, so that the position of (2, p
′ + 1) in O does not matter.
By the induction hypothesis, let R′1 = [T
′
1  b′1  B′1] and R′2 = [T ′2  b′2  B′2] denote
profiles over D1×· · ·×Dp′ such that b′1 (respectively, b′2) is the bundle allocated to agent 1
(respectively, agent 2) in the SPNE of fO′ , and |B′1|+ 1 =
∑p′
i=1 k1,i, |B′2|+ 1 =
∑p′
i=1 k2,i.
Let R1 = [(T
′
1, 1)  (T ′1, 2)  (b′1, 1)  (b′1, 2)  (B′1, 1)  (B′1, 2)] and R2 = [(T ′2, 1) 
(b′2, 1)  (B′2, 1)  (T ′2, 2)  (b′2, 2)  (B′2, 2)], where (T ′1, 1) is a ranking over {(~d, 1) : ~d ∈
T ′1} such that (~d, 1)  (~e, 1) if and only if ~d T ′1 ~e. Therefore, if agent 1 chooses item 1
from category p′ + 1 in the first round, then in the remaining rounds both agents act as if
their preferences are R′1 and R
′
2, respectively, and the CSAM is O′. In this case agent 1 will
get (b′1, 1). Similarly, if agent 1 chooses item 2 from category p
′ + 1 in the first round, then
she will get (b′1, 2). Since agent 1 prefers (b
′
1, 1) to (b
′
1, 2), she will choose item 1 in the first
round, and the final allocation is: agent 1 gets (b′1, 1), whose rank is n
p′+1 − 2|B′1| − 1, and
agent 2 gets (b′2, 2), whose rank is n
p′+1 − |B′2|. We note that k1,p′+1 = 2 and k2,p′+1 = 1.
This proves the proposition for p′ + 1. Therefore, the proposition holds for all p and all
CSAMs. 
